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EQUALITY IN AMERICA:
THE EXPANSION OF A CONCEPT*
JOHN P. RocHE
If we are going to understand the development of the concept
of equality in the United States, we must first of all establish cer-
tain historical propositions, propositions which will provide the
framework for the discussion to come later. At the risk of sound-
ing unAmerican, I must insist that the most important fact in any
analysis is the right theory-though theory alone can hardly carry
the day. To paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the status
of equality in America cannot be solved by abstractions, nor without
them.
Thus we must begin with what I have called "American ex-
ceptionalism," the remarkable fact that the conquest of liberty and
equality in this country has been accomplished under unique his-
torical circumstances. In every other free nation, the struggle for
human liberation has been one of circumscribing the power of an
irresponsible elite-a church, a monarch, an oligarchy, an aristoc-
racy. In other words, freedom for the mass of the population has
been attained by destroying the arbitrary jurisdiction of a small,
self-anointed ruling class. In contrast, the problem in the United
States has always been one of obtaining civil rights from the
majority.
To put the matter differently, the society which emerged on
this side of the Atlantic in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies outran the authority mechanisms of Tudor-Stuart England.
Despite certain rituals, the British provinces in North America were
essentially "do-it-yourself" exercises in community building. And
by the time the British-after the end of the Second Hundred Years
War with France in 1763-got around to asserting their theoretical
rights of sovereignty, these communities were deeply entrenched
behind the barricades of local, responsible self-government.
* This essay was originally delivered as an address in the Franklin
Memorial Series at Wayne State University, April 20, 1964. It will appear
in the forthcoming volume CREA En EQUAL, copyright Wayne State Univer-
sity Press, and is published here with the permission of the copyright holder.
t Morris Hillquit Professor of Labor and Social Thought, Chairmari, De-
partment of Politics, Brandeis University.
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It was John Adams-that brilliant, perverse, and underrated
social theorist-who noted all this and went on to point out that
in terms of elite theory, i.e., who shall rule in America?, the Ameri-
can Revolution was over before the fighting began.' And it proved
impossible for the British to cope with the colonists because the
Redcoats were confronted not by a few malcontents, but by a
thoroughly integrated society resting on a foundation of responsible
self-government. To win the Revolution a few battlefield victories
would not suffice: His Majesty's forces had to crack and destroy a
whole social system.
The Americans fought the British for the right to define their
own rights, the right they claimed from habit and prescription to
run their own communities in their own fashions. And the truth-
finding mechanism was majority rule. The sovereignty of the com-
munity-operating through the majority-was plenary. Everyone,
of course, believed in "natural" and "inalienable" rights, but the
crucial consideration was that the community had the authority to
define the content of these abstractions. The "Peace of the Com-
monwealth" was substituted for the "King's Peace," and the result
was that tyranny of the majority so brilliantly limned by Alexis de
Tocqueville fifty years later:
When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States,
to whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public
opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it repre-
sents the majority and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive
power, it is appointed by the majority and serves as a passive tool
in its hands. The public force consists of the majority under arms;
the jury is the majority invested with the right of hearing judicial
cases; and in certain states even the judges are elected by the
majority. However iniquitous or absurd the measure of which
you complain, you must submit to it as well as you can. 2
The rights of man were thus accorded to the American as de-
fined by his neighbors-a definitional process that could on occasion
be a bit disconcerting. In 1794, for example, at the time of the
discontent over the whiskey tax in Western Pennsylvania, Albert
Gallatin told some of his inflamed neighbors to stop acting like a
"mob." They ominously referred him to a recent resolution which
110 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 282-83 (Adams ed. 1856)
21 TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 271 (Vintage ed. i954).
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proclaimed "that if any one called the people a mob, he should be
tarred and feathered."
'3
Or take the instance of Abner Kneeland, arrested and tried in
Massachusetts in the 1830's for blasphemy on the basis of a tract
denying the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. Kneeland asserted that
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights guaranteed his religious freedom,
but the Supreme Judicial Court held, in the words of Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw, that religious freedom was reserved for "honest"
and "sincere" men-not for blasphemers who were, by definition,
insincere and dishonest disrupters of the peace.'
With this in mind, let us turn to the specific context of equality,
specifically to Jefferson's majestic statement in The Declaration of
Independence that "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness."
A masterpiece of political warfare, The Declaration contained
no qualifications, no reservations. Yet, if we are to consider it as
more than pious propaganda for the American cause, we must
immediately supply a number of unarticulated qualifications. Ne-
groes, Catholics, and atheists (to say nothing of the female half of
the population) could hardly view this as an act of emancipation.
They were not accorded the status of equals in American society,
and the men who voted for The Declaration did not rush home to
remove their disabilities. A large proportion of the signees were,
of course, slaveholders and apparently (and here Jefferson was an
exception; at least he wrestled with his conscience on the slavery
issue-but he won) saw nothing contradictory in affirming the
equality of man one day and buying a slave the next. (This paradox
was not unnoticed; the starkly logical Abigail Adams had written
her husband on September 22, 1774: "It allways appeared a most
iniquitious Scheme to me-fight ourselfs for what we are daily
robbing and plundering from those who have as good a right to free-
dom as we have.") 3
If one were to have the temerity to translate this portion of The
BRACKENRIDGE, INCIDENTS OF THE INSURRECTION 136-37 (1795).
'Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206 (1838). See LEVY, THE LAW
OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAw 43-58 (1957).
"1 THE ADAMS PAPERS, ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE, 1761-1776, at
162 (Butterfield ed. 1963).
1951
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Declaration into operational political theory, a different proposition
would emerge-the proposition which, I submit, is basic to an
understanding of the development of equality in America over the
past three centuries. It would run roughly as follows-all those
who have been admitted to membership by the political community
are equal. In other words, men achieve equality as a function of
membership in the body politic-and this membership is not an
inherent right, but a privilege which the majority accords on its own
terms.
The myth of the libertarian past dies hard, but if we are going
to grasp historical reality, we must once and for all lay to rest the
notion that our forefathers built a pluralistic society around the
principles of liberty and equality.6 What throws many analysts off
is the fact that restrictions on liberty, and inequalities, were un-
questionably the consequence of "democratic procedures"-e.g., an
overwhelmingly Protestant society unthinkingly limited the freedom
of Catholics and atheists. Papists and atheists were not (in the spirit
of the later Smith Act) spokesmen for "opinion," but were sub-
versives, threats to public order. Which is not to say that the fathers
did not believe in liberty and equality. They believed completely in
these great ideals properly defined.
Indeed, this proposition was at the heart of 18th and 19th century
Liberalism. Full membership in the political community, i.e., liberty
and equality, was reserved to those who had-in the eyes of the
Establishment-earned the right to exercise it. And in the United
States the Establishment was majoritarian. It was John Stuart
Mill who gave this collectivist notion of tutelage its classic state-
ment. In an oddly neglected section of his essay On Liberty, Mill
-after asserting the individual's absolute sovereignty over "his own
body and mind"-hastened to add:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant
to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties.
We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the
age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood....
For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those
back ard states of society in which the race itself may be con-
sidered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spon-
taneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of




means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of im-
provement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will
attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a le-
gitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided
the end be their improvement and the means justified by actually
effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to
any state of things anterior to the time when nnkind have become
capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until
then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience. .... .7
Mill was talking about India, which he ran with one hand while
he wrote essays on "Liberty" with the other, but the basic theory
applies equally well to the relationship within a society between those
who "belong" and outsiders. Equality, like liberty, was a condition
conferred by the community at its discretion, usually to "good"
people who had earned their prerogatives.
The problem for discussion here is equality, but for obvious
reasons I shall arbitrarily limit the analysis to the specific problem
of the Negro. The question we are directing ourselves towards may
be put as follows: What have been the historical stages that the
Negro has passed through on his seemingly interminable journey
towards full membership in the American community---i.e., to-
wards acceptance by the majority in the category of "equals"?
This approach, I submit, throws new light on the dilemmas of
the anti-slavery movement in the pre-Civil War period. Any indi-
vidual or group which urged emancipation had perforce to come to
terms with the free Negro, that is, include in his theory an answer
to the question: What becomes of the Negroes after they have been
released from slavery? The radical answer was full integration,
social and political equality. But this ran head-on into the deep-
rooted racial prejudices of the American majority-North and
South.
Here again is de Tocqueville with his characteristic instinct for
the jugular:
As soon as it is admitted that the whites and the emancipated
blacks are placed upon the same territory in the situation of two
foreign communities, it will readily be understood that there are
but two chances for the future: the Negroes and the whites must
either wholly part or wholly mingle. I have already expressed
my conviction as to the latter event. I do not believe that the
"MILL, ON LIBmT 13-14 (Library of Liberal Arts ed. 1956). (Emphasis
added.)
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white and black races will ever live in any country upon an equal
footing. But I believe the difficulty to be still greater in the
United States than elsewhere. An isolated individual may sur-
mount the prejudices of religion, of his country, or of his race;
and if this individual is a king, he may effect surprising changes
in society; but a whole people cannot rise, as it were, above itself.
A despot who should subject the Americans and their former
slaves to the same yoke might perhaps succeed in commingling
their races; but as long as the American democracy remains at the
head of affairs, no one will undertake so difficult a task; and it
,may be foreseen that the freer the white population of the United
States becomes, the nmre isolated will it remain.8
To hazard a historical generalization, I believe that outside of
the South there was a clear majority of the white population op-
posed in principle to slavery-but equally convinced of the "natural
inferiority" of the Negro. (The statute books in Northern states
were littered with discriminatory provisions aimed at controlling
the emigration of free Negroes and at preventing social, political,
and legal equality: the first adjudication of "separate but equal"
was, after all, in Boston in 1850, and segregation was sustained.)"
Northerners, and Westerners, in other words, were not distressed
by Negro inequality, per se, but were increasingly outraged by the
savage social consequences of applied inequality: the slave system.
Sincere and decent people (such as Abraham Lincoln) drew the
moral line this side of chattel slavery, but on the other side of
equality. Characteristically they attempted to formulate a solution
which would simultaneously end slavery and terminate the Negro
problem-and the one arrived at was "colonization," the establish-
ment in Africa (on the model of Liberia and Sierra Leone), or the
West Indies, or the American West (Texas was strongly favored
for the location of the "Black Republic" at one time) of Negro com-
munities. Thus slavery and the Negro would be banished from the
white community in a fashion that should warm the heart of a
contemporary Black Muslin. Except for a few dedicated Aboli-
tionists who argued for full equality, it seems clear that as far as
the overwhelming preponderance of American opinion was con-
cerned, there was no alternative to slavery as an institutional pat-
tern of dealing with the Negro within the white community.
To say this is not to downgrade slavery as a cause of the Civil
8 TocQUEViLLE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 388-89. (Emphasis added.)
g See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
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War; indeed, slavery was crucial. Not because Northerners and
Westerners were committed to equality for the Negro, but because
they were unwilling to allow the South to impose inequality on
whites throughout the Union.' The necessary and logical conse-
quences of the slave system were the suppression of civil rights, the
Southern veto on all legislation which was seen as undermining the
economic and political autonomy of the region, a pro-slavery
foreign policy, civil wars in the territories-indeed, the "militant
South" demanded that the whole thrust of national public policy
be adjusted to the imperatives of the slave system. When the
Southern states abandoned the Union in 1860-1861 because they had
lost the presidential election, the evidence seemed conclusive: slavery
required a rule or ruin approach to American national interest, and
it was obvious that the nation would live in dire jeopardy until this
cancer was removed.
Ironically the majority in the states which sustained the Union
was thus dedicated to freeing the Negroes, but not to making them
equals. And this dichotomy was ominous because it signified that a
Union victory in the Rebellion would only end human slavery; the
future status of the Negro was wrapped in ambiguity and am-
bivalence. Lincoln's soldiers died in fearful numbers to "make men
free," but the survivors did not have the foggiest notion of what to
do with the freedmen once their chains had been removed.
If we examine (admittedly with 20-20 hindsight) the options
that existed in 1865, it is immediately clear that two alternatives
existed. (Colonization was patently out of the question: there were
over four million slaves in 1860 and the establishment of even
small colonies had proved inordinately expensive.) On the one
hand, the slaves could simply be freed and left to fend for them-
selves; on the other, the national government could undertake a
massive program of compensatory assistance for the freedmen,
take them under its protection, and bring them under its tutelage to
full membership in the American community. The problem was,
however, that while the Radical Republicans realized that the first
alternative was disastrous, they lacked the conviction and the
political base necessary to implement the second. Let us examine
the situation as it developed in the Reconstruction period.
1 °For an extraordinarily perceptive analysis of the general role of
slavery in American political thought, see ELKINS, SLAVERY (1959). I differ
with Elkins on a number of points, but his synthesis is invaluable.
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The Lincoln-Johnson program of Reconstruction contemplated
freeing the slaves, establishing loyal state governments in the
temporarily misled South, and then calling it a day. Anyone who
appreciates Abraham Lincoln's sense of political reality may-
admittedly on the basis of spectral evidence-question whether he
would have followed this line to its logical conclusion. For one
thing, the natural leaders of the Southern white community-though
barred from politics for participation in the Rebellion-were hardly
going to be eliminated from influence; and the marginal political
credentials of Southern Unionists made them bad long-run political
risks." In short, the power structure of the Southern white com-
munity could never be cracked by marginal political figures, par-
ticularly those who had fought against the "Boys in Grey." (It is
perhaps pure speculation, but I have always suspected that both
Lincoln and Johnson-Southern poor whites in origin-held the
illusion that if the planter magnates were excluded from the political
process, the non-slaveholding whites would implement the prin-
ciples of true democracy, i.e., they assumed the existence of a "class
division" and refused to believe that the magnates were in fact the
natural elite.)
It rapidly became apparent to the Republican leaders in Con-
gress that the Lincoln-Johnson program of Reconstruction was a
total failure; nothing was really reconstructed. The Negro, now
free, was still at the mercy of the police power and was put into
what amounted to serfdom by the Black Codes and labor contract
legislation. And the worst of it was that freeing the slaves in-
creased Southern representation in the House of Representatives
and the Electoral College. (In 1860, the slave states had seventeen
members of Congress "representing" the three-fifths Compromise
in the Constitution; with the freed Negroes counted per capita for
representation purposes, they would pick up another dozen.)' 2
Political self-interest, to say nothing of principle-or of the merger
of the two that most of us silently manage-required guarantees
for the future.
Thus began Congressional Reconstruction which, from the
viewpoint of social theory, had as its objective the demolition of
the white power structure in the South. I can hardly take the time
1 There is no finer study of the political dynamics of Reconstruction than




here to discuss Reconstruction in detail, but the key point for our
purposes is that while the Radicals knew precisely what they hoped
to accomplish, they refused to accept the only theory which could
provide consistency and justification to their actions, that of the full
potential equality of the Negro. Some few did, but the great bulk
of Republican Congressmen and Senators-and more important,
their constituents-did not. The War had been fought to free the
Negro, not to make an equal of him, and now that the fighting was
over and slavery destroyed, the average Unionist wanted to go
home and bask in the sunshine of peace. He was capable of getting
quite angry at Southern efforts to reverse the verdict of Appomattox
(see the congressional elections of 1866), but he was not willing to
underwrite that sustained effort which alone could bring equality to
the Negro.
Cracking a social system is not an exercise in rhetoric-it is a
campaign which must be mounted with strong administrative in-
struments and backed by a full political commitment to change.
Indeed, what has struck me as remarkable is the relative success
of the much maligned Freedmen's Bureau. Sent out into hostile
country with no conventional weapons for dealing with militant local
majorities (only troops, the ultimate weapon in administration), and
virtually no infrastructure to maintain day to day operations, the
Bureau's many devoted agents were the unsung heroes of the one
effort that could conceivably have broken the social pattern of the
South. 3 One who today reads the statute 4 establishing the Bureau
must marvel at the institutional genius of its authors: it was an
extremely sound attempt at the most difficult accomplishment known
to politics-elite building. And it failed not because of its con-
ceptual weakness, but because it never obtained that massive com-
mitment to its goals which made, for example, MacArthur's recon-
struction of Japanese society possible.
To summarize, in the brief years of Radical Reconstruction
there was an effort in such measures as the Civil Rights Act of
1866,1 the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, 6 the fourteenth and fifteenth
" There is no broad study of the Freedmen's Bureau which approaches
it from the viewpoint I am suggesting. BENTLY, HISTORY OF THE FREED-
MEN'S BUREAU (1955) is thorough-and thoroughly unsympathetic to the
basic objectives of the Bureau.
"' Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865).
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
18 Ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, as amended, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
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amendments, to establish a national definition of equality, one which
looked to the incorporation of the freed Negro into the political
community. But these measures were supported by different men
for different reasons and, I am convinced, reflected in the bulk of
their supporters a limited conviction that racial equality should be
enforced in the South for political reasons. To say this is not for
one moment to slur the memory of that noble band of true egali-
tarians who spearheaded both the struggle against slavery and
against the reassertion of Southern racism under other forms in the
post-Civil War period; it is simply to suggest that their idealism did
not reflect the views of the majority in the North and West, whose
immediate interest in eliminating Southern power was otherwise
motivated. (It should be recalled that the Southern bloc in Congress
had long barred the passage of a Homestead Act, a true protective
tariff, railroad land-grants, and a number of other measures near and
dear to the hearts of the North and West.)
Every nation, it seems, had some national obsession; for the
United States racism has been the plague which has undermined
our strength and national purpose since the eighteenth century.
We cannot tarry here to recount the collapse of the Republican
effort to nationalize liberty and equality-the political side of this
has been told with sensitivity and perception by C. Vann Woodward
in his Reunion and Reaction.1 7 We should, however, examine the
process by which the fourteenth amendment and its companion
civil rights act were converted into battle monuments. This eviscera-
tion began in the Civil Rights Cases 8 in which the Supreme Court
delivered the coup de grdce to national efforts to protect the Negro
from the "customary" disabilities imposed by "private" action.
By giving an extremely narrow interpretation to the fourteenth
amendment Justice Joseph P. Bradley (with the former slaveholder
Justice John Marshall Harlan alone dissenting) ruled that only
formal state action of a discriminatory character fell within the
amendment's interdict. Consequently, "private" racial discrimina-
tion by railroads, theatres, hotels, and the like was held to be a
matter within the sole jurisdiction of the states. Bradley suggested
'" Wo0DwARD, RIUNIoN AND REACTIOx (1951). Part of the remainder of
this essay is adapted from Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise,
31 U. CirI. L. REV. 103 (1963). A number of points alluded to here are there
developed in detail.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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that to rule otherwise would make the Negroes favorites of the na-
tional government and would discriminate against white men, who
presumably were in need of equal treatment. 9
The Bradley opinion has to be understood as a period-piece.
It was grossly unhistorical: The framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment were attempting to provide constitutional certainty for the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 which penalized racial discrimination
by "custom" as well as by "law."20 In an ironic sense, Bradley's
opinion echoed President Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act,
which was promptly overridden by two-thirds of both houses of
Congress.2 Fundamentally, justice Bradley declared the four-
teenth amendment, as originally conceived, to be unconstitutional.
Significantly, Bradley noted in private correspondence that he
was very disturbed by the alleged "power of Congress to pass laws
for enforcing social equality between the races." 2 In realistic
terms "social equality" was hardly a real issue in the 1870's or 80's;
the fact of the matter was that by 1883, the Negro had been left
to his fate by Congress, the President, and the American (white)
people. All Justice Bradley did was incorporate the realities of the
day into the fourteenth amendment. Bradley shared the common
view that the white man had been discriminated against by the civil
rights laws with unfortunate results. He demanded fair play for the
white population.
"Private acts" (though in fact they were enforced by the police
power of the state) were thus eliminated from national jurisdiction.
Even the action of a railroad, which Bradley had agreed was "af-
fected with a public interest," being in effect a quasi-public corpora-
tion, was a "private" decision so far as racial discrimination was
concerned. Thus a railroad became a schizophrenic entity: Some of
its decisions were public (rates and schedules, for example) and
some private (racial segregation). By these same paradoxical rules,
a state law banning racial segregation on interstate carriers was un-
constitutional as a burden on interstate commerce,23 while a similar
10 Ibid.
20 Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27.
2 See Johnson's veto message of March 27, 1866, in 6 RICHARDSON, MES-
SAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 405 (1897).
22 For an examination of Bradley's role in the undermining of the civil
rights acts, see Roche, supra note 17, at 108-11." Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
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law requiring segregation was upheld as a legitimate police regula-
tion.24
As it survived the Civil Rights Cases, the fourteenth amend-
ment limited only state action depriving individuals of due process
or equal protection of the laws. Occasionally the Court did find
some state action, for example, a law barring Negroes from juries,
to be unconstitutional;25 but the characteristic pattern of racial dis-
crimination was left undisturbed by the development of two sub-
sidiary propositions. First, "state action" was generally defined in a
very narrow legalistic fashion as action taken in pursuance of state
law: The fact that no Negro had ever been called to jury duty was,
for example, no proof as far as the Court was concerned that
Negroes were being discriminated against, providing no law forbade
their serving on juries.26 Moreover, if an official act of discrimina-
tion was technically in violation of a state constitution or statute,
it was not considered "state action" on the ground that a state can-
not be held responsible for the illegal actions of its agents.
The Court began in 1883 the process of redefining "equal pro-
tection" that culminated in constitutional sanction for "Jim Crow"
laws in the 1896 decision of Plessy v. Ferguson.28 Although seldom
emphasized by commentators, the decision in Pace v. Alabama20 was
in loco parentis to the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy. At issue
were two Alabama laws: the first punishing fornication or adultery
between persons of the same race as a misdemeanor (100 dollar
fine or six months in jail) ; the second making it a felony for per-
sons of different races to intermarry or live in adultery or fornica-
tion with each other (two to seven years in jail). A Negro man
and a white woman, who had been sentenced to two years in prison,
appealed their sentences on the ground that the differential treat-
ment prescribed by statute for interracial sexual relations was state
action denying them equal protection of the laws. Note that the law
penalized intermarriage on the same basis as illicit relations.
Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
" See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). But discrimination by a state
judge, even in the absence of a statute, was held to be state action in EX parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
2 See Justice Frankfurter's examination of this proposition in his dissent
in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961).
28163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
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Justice Stephen J. Field, for a unanimous Court, found no
difficulty in sustaining the Alabama code. A man may have had a
natural right to follow his calling, in Field's view, but he had no
equivalent right to choose his wife free from state control. The laws
under attack did not discriminate against Negroes, observed Field,
any more than they did against whites:
The two sections of the Code cited are entirely consistent. The one
prescribes, generally, a punishment for an offense committed be-
tween persons of different sexes; the other prescribes a punish-
ment for an offense which can only be committed when the two
sexes are of different races. There is in neither section any dis-
crimination against either race.
30
After all, Field concluded, both the Negro and the white woman
received the same punishment.
While Field's opinion was brief, its import for the future was
enormous. In less than three pages, the Justice, his eight brethren
concurring, effectively torpedoed the equal protection clause. Even
Harlan could not dissent in this instance; miscegenation probably
hit him at his weakest point: his fundamentally Southern social and
religious convictions about the distinctiveness of the "races."'
What Pace v. Alabama did was reestablish the legal category "Negro"
-it now became legitimate for the states to differentiate formally
between Negroes and whites as they did between men and women,
or aliens and citizens. While the purpose of the equal protection
clause had been to eliminate from American law the category
"Negro"-its authors were infuriated by the "Black Codes"-the
Court now told the states that "race" was a valid basis for differenti-
ation among its citizens.
But in the case of the category "Negro" few limitations were
discovered. Recall that in Pace v. Alabama the Court implicitly held
that the state could, in the effort to maintain public morality, treat
marriage between a white and a Negro as if it were adultery or
fornication. In short, the "race" of one partner could convert a
lawful relationship into a felony. Moreover, in defiance of the his-
tory of race relations in the South, "Negro" was treated as a homo-
geneous category: white supremacists apparently saw nothing il-
logical in defining as a Negro anyone with one Negro grandparent,
10 Id. at 585.
" Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes,
66 YALE L.J. 673 (1957).
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or great-grandparent in some states, though when the odds got up
to seven to one, some questions arise as to which is the "master
race." Even when, as in Alabama, one Negro grandparent was
decisive, the category was a bit eccentric; it was rather as if a state
legislature had defined a basket of apples as a basket containing at
least twenty-five per cent apples. This problem, however, never
troubled either Southern politicians or the courts.
In terms of the social system, the Negro, even at the zenith of
"Radical Reconstruction," never achieved equality. From the view-
point of the Southern white community, the Civil Rights Acts were
a marginal harassment; Union troops were a problem, but the last
blue contingent went North in 1877. With the outlawing of
"Black Codes," informal measures of social control, which were no
less effective because informal, were utilized to the same end.
Then, in the late '80's and early '90's, began the flood of "Jim Crow"
legislation, laws based on the principle enunciated in Pace v. Ala-
baina that Negroes were different from whites and that this dis-
tinction justified differential treatment. Curiously, as Professor C.
Vann Woodward has noted (and Tocqueville predicted), "the bar-
riers of racial discrimination mounted in direct ratio with the tide of
political democracy among whites. In fact, an increase of Jim
Crow laws upon the statute books of a state is almost an accurate
index of the decline of the reactionary regimes of the Redeemers
and triumph of white democratic movements.18 2 The Redeemers
had used the Negroes as pawns in their maintenance of political
power; now the Negroes were to be punished for their cardinal sin
-helplessness.
The classic "Jim Crow" law was an enactment requiring racial
segregation in railroad and tram cars. In order to understand the
importance of the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Fergu-
son, which provided the constitutional foundation for racial dis-
crimination until 1954, 3 let us review the principle involved. When
a state required that railroads provide facilities for whites and
Negroes on a separate basis, it was establishing a classification on
the basis of "race." For this classification to be sustained in the face
of the equal protection clause, it had to be demonstrated that
separation based on "race" was a reasonable method of attaining a
2 WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEw SOUTH 211 (1951).
' See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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legitimate legislative goal: the maintenance of public health, morals,
and welfare. Assuming for purposes of argument that some special
"escientific" rationale could be introduced to justify laws against inter-
marriage, there would be no necessary carryover to transportation.
One can require, for example, that men and women use different
dressing rooms at the beach without insisting that they swim at
different places. In short, the emotionally charged problem of sexual
relations present in Pace v. Alabama was absent in Plessy v. Fer-
guson. If the Court sustained the statute, it would be hard to
conceive of any social, economic, or political relationship in which
segregation could not be legally required.
In 1890, Louisiana passed a "Jim Crow" transportation law.
One Homer Adolph Plessy was arrested for attempting to enter
the coach reserved for whites and refusing to leave when ordered to
do so. There is an air of unreality about the whole episode: Plessy
was one-eighth Negro and insisted that he was "white." Like his
French contemporary Captain Dreyfus, who was something of an
anti-Semite, Plessy was hardly a fighter for the rights of man.
The Louisiana courts declared him a Negro and he challenged the
constitutionality of the statute. Dividing seven to one, the Supreme
Court upheld the Louisiana enactment.
Justice Henry B. Brown wrote the opinion of the Court. Early
in his statement, he put the holding in a nutshell: "A statute which
implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races
. . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two
races . . . ."4 After examining precedents and noting that the state
legislatures must be permitted a large area of reasonable discretion
in their police power enactments-a latitude, it might be recalled,
the Court was reluctant to grant in the economic sphere-Brown
came to the heart of his opinion. The whole difficulty, he averred,
arose from Negro hypersensitivity:
We consider the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument to con-
sist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so,
it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.35
As the clincher to this argument, Brown observed that if the Ne-
groes controlled state legislatures and passed "precisely similar"
163 U.S. at 543.
'DId. at 551.
19651
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
enactments, white men would not feel they had been assigned an
inferior position. 6
This brings us to Brown's sociology which needs to be set out
at some length in his own words:
The argument [against the segregation statute] also assumes that
social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal
rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced com-
mingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition.
If the two races are to meet on terms of social equality, it must be
the result of mutual affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's
merits and a voluntary consent of individuals .... Legislation is
powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical difference .... If the civil and political rights
of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly
or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them on the same
plane.37
It was precisely in this period that racial theories reached their
apogee in the United States; among biologists, sociologists, and social
anthropologists as well as journalists and political commentators, the
assumptions of Baron Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain-that
races were discrete entities and that the white or "Caucasian" race
was superior to the others-were taken for granted. The southern
politician, of course, needed no lofty theoretical justification for
white supremacy-he knew what he wanted and really did not care
how the scientists, journalists, or Supreme Court Justices rational-
ized his attainment of racial segregation. But the better elements
in the community needed a respectable intellectual base to justify
discrimination, and the "social science" of the time supplied the
requisite foundation.
Negroes, then, were biologically different from whites, es-
sentially members of a different species, set apart by their "racial
instincts." Thus, in the same fashion that an intelligent zoo keeper
separates the lions and the elephants in different compounds, the
Supreme Court endorsed the proposition that biologically distinct
Negroes and whites need not be given identical treatment. What
was good for Negroes was not necessarily good for whites, any
3o Ibid.
Id. at 551-52. (Emphasis added.). Brown thus held the statute to be a




more than a lion would necessarily thrive on an elephant's- diet.
Fundamental to this view, though not explicit in Brown's opinion,
was the further corollary that the whites were more advanced, more
"civilized," than the Negroes, that they were several stages higher in
the evolutionary scale.
Once the proposition that Negroes were in essence a distinct
biological category had been established (by ipse dixit), the prin-
ciple of proportional equality could come into play. Equality, ac-
cording to Aristotle and a steady stream of theorists since, is treat-
ment according to merits or deserts. (For Aristotle, however, a
man's merits were a function of his potentialities, not of the color
of his skin or the color of one great-grandparent's skin.) Now
merit became a function of membership in a racial category, and
the "Negro Race" had no claim to treatment in the laws of the
United States identical with that accorded members of the "Caucasian
Race." While the analogy is perhaps banal, recall that the zoo
keeper does not "discriminate" against the elephant when he feeds
him hay instead of the red meat beloved by lions. On this basis,
Justice Brown could blandly and quite sincerely state that segregated
treatment for Negroes was only a consequence of their distinctive-
ness and was in no way a "badge of inferiority." Only a psychotic
elephant would complain because he got no steak.
Justice Harlan wrote what many consider his finest dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson. It is an interesting opinion because Harlan
subscribed completely to the "Negro Race" theory, but refused to
admit the relevance of this "social science" to American constitu-
tional law. "The white race," said Harlan, "deems itself to be
the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt
not that it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its
great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. 3 8 The Constitution, Harlan thundered, "is color-blind" ;'9
the former colonel of Kentucky volunteers in Lincoln's army effec-
tively charged the Court with overruling the verdict of Appomattox.
He asserted bluntly that "the judgment this day rendered will, in time,
prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal
in the Dred Scott Case."4 "Every true man has pride of race,"
88 Id. at 559.
8" Ibid.'0 Ibid.
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observed the Justice, "but I deny that any legislative body or
judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the
civil rights of those citizens are involved."4 1
Equal protection of the laws was in this fashion glossed by the
Supreme Court to eliminate juridical equality of Negroes; es-
sentially a state fulfilled the requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment if it treated all whites equally, all Negroes equally, and granted
"substantial equality" to Negroes vis-A.-vis whites. The Court's
holding unloosed a flood of "Jim Crow" lawmaking in all the
Southern, and even some of the Northern, states, a flood which
ended by submerging every aspect of day to day life under the
protocol of segregation. As Woodward has shown, some ingenious
legislator in one state would devise a new law, providing segrega-
tion coverage for some area theretofore overlooked, and it would
rapidly spread from state to state in a wave of mimicry. 2 It seems
to have become a species of nasty game-and one totally lacking a
logical rationale. The same Negro woman who prepared a white
family's meals and all but raised its children would be compelled
to use the "Colored" drinking fountain, the "Colored" wash rooms
and sit in the back of the trolley to keep the white population uncon-
taminated.
Indeed, a case can be made from the viewpoint of the Negro,
the picture got worse rather than better as the United States moved
into the twentieth century. For one thing, perhaps under the im-
pact of the racial dogmas which were so popular, the number of
white men who were concerned about the cause of Negro rights
went into decline after the Civil War. As the old radicals-Charles
Sumner, Wendell Phillips, George W. Julian, William Lloyd Gar-
rison--died, there were few replacements. The reductio ad absurdum
probably came in 1903 when the program of the Louisiana Socialist
Party came out for "separation of the black and white races into
separate communities, each race to have charge of its own affairs. '4
A second cause of Negro discouragement was the spread of
Southern white racial mores into the North and West, a phenomenon
which accelerated with World War I and the concomitant exodus
of Negroes from Southern farms to Northern factories, or to serv-
,Id. at 554.
"WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (rev. ed. 1957).
'" Cited in KIPNIS, THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT, 1897-1912, at
131 (1952).
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ice jobs in factory towns. The early years of the new century were
racked by a series of savage race riots; significantly they took place in
cities on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line, the two worst being
in Atlanta (1906) and Springfield, Illinois (1908). According to
John Hope Franklin, more than a hundred Negroes were lynched
iri the first year of the century, and "before the outbreak of World
War I the number ... had soared to more than 1100." 4
These decisions offer a good insight into the operation of the
American constitutional process. Two Supreme Court holdings-
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson-dealt squarely with the
merits of state segregation laws. Yet the Court's rulings in these
cases, particularly in the Plessy case, were by extrapolation used to
validate the whole structure of "Jim Crow." The fundamental
question-whether state-enforced segregation violates the equal
protection clause-was not (with one area of exception) reexamined
by the Supreme Court until the 1940's and 1950's. Thus, while
lawyers are technically within their guild prerogative when they
assert that a Supreme Court decision is only a determination of the
case at bar, the Justices in one "limited" holding (enforced segre-
gation in transportation does not violate the equal protection of the
laws, Plessy v. Ferguson) in social and institutional terms gave their
imprimatur to the whole structure of white supremacy. In other
words, the Plessy opinion was a monumental piece of judicial
legislation-the Supreme Court effectively amended the Constitu-
tion of the United States by rewriting the fourteenth amendment in
terms of majority opinion.
I shall not attempt here to trace the story into the twentieth
century (I have covered the matter in detail in my recent book, The
Quest for the Dream)." Suffice it to say that it is quite clear to me
that right up through World War II the Negro was excluded from
the political community.
Indeed, we have lingered too long with the past-compulsive be-
havior in a historian, I suppose-and the time has come to show some
respect for the constitutional injunction against cruel and unusual
punishment. What I hope has emerged is the role of "American
Exceptionalism" in the struggle for equality, that is, the fact that
inequality for the Negro (and the Jew, the Irishman, the Asian,
"FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 432 (1947).
"ROcHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DREAM (1963).
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the Mexican) has been a consequence of the refusal on the part of
the majority to accord equal status-which in turn has arisen from
majority refusal to consider the Negro as a "man" among "men"
at the same time that it affirmed vehemently that "all men are
created equal."
The transformation of American attitudes towards equality has
thus been an outgrowth of the tremendous war that has been waged
in the United States over the past half century against our ancient
curse of racism, a campaign that began in private'hands but has now
been turned over to public authority. This has not been a passive
affair, one based solely on education (that wonderful slogan for
avoiding activism) because as we all know stateways can change
folkways (to use Sumner's old categories) and the power of the
state, notably of the national government, has been decisive in bring-
ing real equality to the United States. Morality can be legislated-
segregationists are currently fighting to preserve their huge body of
morals legislation on the racial question-but it can only be legis-
lated successfully when it is backed by strong national commitment.
Legislation, however, cannot make the Negro equal-he has lived
too long under the burdens of discrimination. It can and should pro-
vide him with the instruments by which to achieve his proper partici-
pating place in the American community and in particular it should
be premised on the theory that only by giving this generation of
Negroes special compensatory treatment can the next generation
stand on its own.
Let us make one historical proposition perfectly clear: as a com-
munity we have, since the days when veterans of the American
Revolution were given preference in western lands, applied the
principles of compensatory treatment to many categories in the
population. As a veteran of World War II, I have been compensated
in many fashions: the G.I. Bill subsidized my Ph.D., a civil service
point bonus awaits my use, and my home is mortgaged under highly
favorable conditions. However, as an author I find myself without
the benefits of a cotton farmer: regrettably the government does
not purchase and hold overstock of my books, nor pay me not to
write more than one a year. The cotton farmer is given special
preference because of the eccentricities of nature; the vagaries of
book purchasers have yet to receive adequate historical standing.
Thus it is absurd to oppose special historical treatment for the
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Negro on principled grounds unless one is simultaneously urging
the abolition of, inter alia, the Veterans Administration, the agri-
cultural subsidy program, the "impacted areas" educational sub-
ventions, and the tariff. We can hardly argue that the Negro should
be the first group in American history which must "stand on its own
two feet."
The American people, led by their President, the courts, their
churches, and other private groups, have finally faced up to the fact
that equality for the Negro is, in President Johnson's phrase, "a
moral right." We have passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"6 the
first meaningful civil rights act in our modern history, and this
is only a beginning. As a political community we now have the
obligation, the moral duty, to provide an existential as well as a
formal content to equality: to display our remorse and our creativity
by devising massive programs in the areas of housing, education,
employment, and the like which will indicate to the Negro that we
are not merely paying lip-service to a slogan. (I support this for all
deprived Americans, but the Negroes are clearly a priority case.)
Let me conclude by noting the significance of what I have been
discussing. Without realizing it, most of us have lived through a
truly remarkable episode in the development of a democratic society.
By and large, we Americans are a historyless people-history begins
the day we start a job-and we need on occasion to look backwards
and meditate on what we observe. What has happened in the course
of the last quarter of a century in the area of equality is nothing
less than spectacular: anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism (once the
common currency of our culture) have been driven to the paranoid
littoral. And the Negro has been accepted as a Man.
No one living in the racial turmoil of 1964 can imagine for a
minute that the war is over. Yet, as I look at American history,
and the structure of politics in 1964, it appears that we have, on
the crucial theoretical level, broken the back of racism. A lot of
nasty mopping up remains to be done: the Negro has yet to receive
his minimal rights in such citadels of racism as Alabama and Mis-
sissippi, and economic realities elsewhere, North and South, often
make a mockery of his formal prerogatives. But, as the vote on the
Civil Rights Act, the presidential election, and polls indicate, the
consensus is there, and the muscle will be provided.
" Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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In essence, we have had a "white Revolution" rather than a
"Negro Revolution" (which would have been doomed in a society
ninety per cent white), a radical transformation in the attitudes of
the majority. And as a majority "Revolution" this trend has the
inexorable crushing power of a glacier.
The American majority, in other words, has finally-in that
violent, amorphous fashion which has always characterized our cul-
ture--determined to give full coverage to The Declaration of Inde-
pendence. And while we must feel shame at the intolerable delay,
we can also find some pride in knowing that those of us who have
fought for racial equality all our lives did not misjudge the vitality
of the democratic process nor the latent decency of the American
people.
